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Dom Pérignon Vs. Miller Lite: Investigating Anti-Elite Sentiment at the Individual
Level
Abstract
As right-wing populism has gained a stronger footing globally, so have the ideas that right-wing populists
support. Developed democracies are exhibiting high levels of political distrust and anti-elite sentiment,
which pose a serious threat to the health of democracy and existing political systems. While there are
system-level trends that contribute to anti-elitism, there remain variations in individual anti-elite
sentiment. Two broad schools of thought suggest explanations; one contending that the way an individual
perceives and responds to their economic situation leads to anti-elite sentiment, and the other, that antielite sentiment has risen as a reactionary undercurrent to the “silent revolution” of the last half of the 20th
Century. Using Round 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS), this research investigates a third approach
which brings together insights of the cultural and economic explanations, the “left-behind” hypothesis.
This study finds that those who perceive themselves as “left-behind” by economic and cultural trends
express stronger anti-elite sentiments than even the poorest “losers of globalization,” or the most
traditionally conservative.
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Zoe Bouras
Abstract: As right-wing populism has gained a stronger footing globally, so have the ideas that
right-wing populists support. Developed democracies are exhibiting high levels of political
distrust and anti-elite sentiment, which pose a serious threat to the health of democracy and
existing political systems. While there are system-level trends that contribute to anti-elitism,
there remain variations in individual anti-elite sentiment. Two broad schools of thought suggest
explanations; one contending that the way an individual perceives and responds to their
economic situation leads to anti-elite sentiment, and the other, that anti-elite sentiment has risen
as a reactionary undercurrent to the “silent revolution” of the last half of the 20th Century.
Using Round 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS), this research investigates a third approach
which brings together insights of the cultural and economic explanations, the “left-behind”
hypothesis. This study finds that those who perceive themselves as “left-behind” by economic
and cultural trends express stronger anti-elite sentiments than even the poorest “losers of
globalization,” or the most traditionally conservative.
Introduction
“ ‘ Howard Dean,’ the husband says, ‘should take his tax-hiking, government-expanding, lattedrinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New-York-Times-reading’ –at which point the wife
interrupts to finish the sentence - -‘body piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show back
to Vermont, where it belongs.’”
The last 50 years in international politics can be characterized by a steep decline in
political trust and the rise of anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes. Lower levels of political
trust have many serious repercussions; scholars suggest that it can lead to the eventual
dissolution of existing political systems and the downfall of modern liberal democracy (Dalton,
2004; Gidron and Hall, 2017; van der Meer and Hakhverdian; 2017). Within the overarching
theme of “political distrust” there are various sub-categories to be identified; distrust of
supranational organizations, government institutions, elites, and the media. This study will deal
specifically with the decline of public trust in elites and the rise of anti-elite sentiment (Dalton
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2004). Some academics suggest that anti-elite sentiment is one of the least important dimensions
of trust as it has the least severe repercussions, because elites are subject to change and because
anti-elite sentiment is not entirely surprising in a representative system (Dalton, 1988, 2004;
Seyd 2008 ). This explanation, however, does not give due consideration to the consequences of
widespread anti-elite sentiment. Scholars should be concerned when voters are distrustful of
politicians and other political, economic, and cultural elites, because that distrust and cynicism is
a defining characteristic of populism, and populism is often viewed as a threat to liberal
democracy (Mudde 2007). Indeed the ideological core of populism involves a deep-seated
distrust of elites and intellectuals, and the rhetoric so often used by populist parties and actors
pits the pure, regular people against the corrupt and wicked elite. There is also evidence that as
anti-elite sentiment rises, social capital declines, and citizen health and wellbeing worsens
(Putnam 2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Hilger 2016). This study seeks to address the question
of why specific individuals develop anti-elite attitudes, and while distrust is embedded in a larger
structural context, this cross-national European study will attempt to identify specific markers
that influence anti-elitism at the individual level.
Anti-Elite Sentiment in Context
Scholarly literature suggests a variety of factors to explain why citizens are losing faith in
their elites at the international, societal, and individual levels. While some scholarship
emphasizes the role of just one level of influence, other academics, such as Russell Dalton and
Arlie Russell Hochschild, suggest that the real explanation is a combination of influences. At the
systemic level, explanations include: actual cases of corruption; the changing nature of the
media; and the activities of politicians and elites themselves, which may reinforce and exacerbate
perceptions that elites are untrustworthy, incompetent, or corrupt. At the individual level,
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demographic variables associated with cultural change and a feeling of being “left behind” by
mainstream society appear to play a definitive role (Hochschild, 2016). Before examining these
two levels of explanation, it is important to define elites and what anti-elite attitudes are.
Who are the elites?
The term elite once commonly referred to those with money or power, however, there has
been a shift in the way that “elite” is used in common parlance. Now, elite not only includes the
politically powerful or rich, but also carries a cultural connotation, and lifestyle has created a
new strata of elitism. The cultural elite, sometimes referred to as the “metropolitan elite,” is an
idea that has permeated many post-industrial societies around the globe (Tierney 2004). This
emphasis is perpetuated by populist parties, pitting the regular, proper, and “pure” general
citizenry against the “corrupt” and distant elite is a hallmark of populist platforms (Betz and
Johnson 2004; Mudde 2007). Not only are elites different and disinterested, but they are
publicized as being the antithesis of good government and the representation of the general will
of the people. “Central to the contemporary radical right’s politics of resentment is the charge
that in liberal capitalist democracies power has been usurped by a self-serving political and
cultural elite that pursues its own narrow agenda without concern for the legitimate concerns and
interests of ordinary citizens” (Betz and Johnson 2004). There are many contemporary examples
of this rhetoric. The 2004 U.S. Presidential election offered a clear example of this definitional
shift, when a right-wing political group known as the Club for Growth launched an advertising
campaign that identified democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean as someone who,
“should take his tax-hiking, government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving,
New-York-Times-reading, body-piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show back to
Vermont” (Tierney 2004). This bears a striking resemblance to a statement by a politician from
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New Zealand First which categorizes elites as being, “the spa bath, Chardonnay sipping, social
[i.e. left-wing] elitists who have more interest in the fine arts than they do in working class
Kiwis” (Betz and Johnson 2004). Cas Mudde (2007) also considers this on an international scale
when he identifies examples within the European context, for instance in Romania, the Greater
Romania Party (PRM) published, “a list of top intellectuals who should be shot for the greater
good of the country” (Mudde 2007). Given this, the discussion of anti-elite sentiment becomes
very broad, but the political consequences remain severe.
System Level
Contemporary anti-elitism is nestled in a system-level, international context. Trends
associated with changing media standards, globalization, the rise of internet technology, and the
rise of right wing populism contribute to a wide-ranging suspicion of elites that is more
generalizable than simply an increase in corruption (Dalton 2004). In Democratic Choices,
Democratic Challenges (2004), Dalton addresses this by stating that in the American case
conversation focuses on, “…Vietnam, Watergate, Abscam,” and “Iran-Contra,” but, most places
in the world have no experience of those specific incidents (Dalton 2004). While the Watergate
scandal may have seriously changed thinking about politicians and the presidency in a U.S.
context, it should not have affected trust in elites in New Zealand or Switzerland, yet people in
New Zealand and Switzerland do exhibit declining levels of political trust (Dalton 2004). It is
clear that “…coincidental unique political crises across a large and diverse set of nations is an
improbable explanation of general patterns...” and as such, we need to look to the individual
level to ascertain what truly drives anti-elite attitudes (Dalton 2004).
There is evidence to suggest that real cases of corruption do not carry as much weight as
the perception of corruption, and there are many systematic influences on the prevalence of these
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perceptions (Ziller and Schubel 2015; van der Meer and Hahkverdian 2017). People and
organizations that have public platforms are able to influence how other people decide which
issues are worth caring about; this agenda-setting ability has become more problematic since the
large-scale introduction of the Internet, as now essentially anyone can have a visible platform
there. Recently, there was even a case of a sub-reddit being the first Google result when
searching for a mass shooting in the United States (Levin, 2017). This high level of accessibility
poses problems on two fronts: firstly, it is easier than ever to spread misinformation, and
secondly, the real facts and positions of experts and elites become diluted by the rest of the
discourse. Similarly, politicians and experts themselves may contribute to the public view that
elites shouldn’t be trusted (CNN 2011; Vaccines 2015; Hochschil 2016; Lahren 2017).
Increasingly, political campaigns are run on a platform of “cleaning up” government, and there is
no lack of examples of experts contradicting themselves (Mudde 2007; CNN 2011;Tuttle
2015;Vaccines 2015; Hoschchild 2016; Beczak 2017). These contradictions and challenges to
elites and the establishment work to reinforce ideas of anti-elitism. The public is constantly
confronted by a discourse that suggests that there is indeed something inherent to politicians and
elites of which they should be skeptical.
The media also plays a key role in the public perception of elites, and over the last two
decades there have been global shifts in journalistic practices and the way that people receive
their news (World 2007; Smith and Searles 2014; Sheets, Bos, and Boomgaarden 2016;
Andersen 2017; Digital 2017). News media in general has become more partisan and sensational,
and again the agenda-setting ability of the media comes into play by directing the political
narrative (Klapper 1984;McCombs and Shaw 20984; McQuail 1984; Smith and Searless 2014;
Sheets, Bos and Boomgaarden 2016). In the contemporary day, technology and social media
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work together to exacerbate this effect, as it is increasingly easy to self-select confirmatory news
sources and enter into a “filter-bubble” (Smith and Searless 2014).
While these systemic influences are plausible and can explain broad trends in anti-elite
sentiment in the developed world, they cannot account for differences in the level of anti-elite
sentiment across individuals in post-industrial democracies. It is then important to examine
individual level influences to ascertain why some people are more likely than others to exhibit
anti-elite sentiment.
Individual Level
One of the ways that scholars view individual attitudes toward politics and elites is
through the lens of economic loss; scholars have used various names such as, “losers of
globalization,” and “economic deprivation” to describe this framework. These theories contend
that the economic problems that have arisen as a result of an increasingly globalized world, such
as outsourced jobs and income inequality, are the main source of frustration for citizens
(Hessami 2011; Gidron and Hall 2017). The economic perspective “emphasizes the
consequences for electoral behavior arising from profound changes transforming the workforce
and society in post-industrial economies” (Inglehart and Norris 2016). It is a very clear cut way
to pit the “us” against the “them,” or, as Inglehart and Norris (2016) phrase it, the “haves”
against the “have nots.” Those most likely to feel these economic impacts of economic insecurity
are the low income earners; the unskilled, the “long-term unemployed;” those who are unable or
unwilling to take advantage of the “travel and consumption” opportunities of increased
globalization and modern openings in the job market; and the poorer sectors of society with
vested interests in redistributive policy and economic stability (Hessami 2011; Gidron and Hall
2017). Those at the bottom of the income ladder are more likely to favor redistributive policy
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and objectives, and as such, they are likely to be left-wing populists. The problems that these
people face can be seen as the fault of the economically and culturally powerful; “…blaming
‘Them’ for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’ ”(Inglehart and
Norris, 2016).
The “cultural backlash” hypothesis provides an alternative explanation that focuses on
the undercurrent of reaction in post-industrial societies to the liberalizing cultural shifts that
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Inglehart and Norris 2016). This negative reaction to
progressive cultural change builds on the idea that in the 1970s there was a silent revolution
which resulted from high levels of economic security, education, peace-time, and a new
emphasis on “new” politics and post materialist values (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). This
rhetoric will be more appealing to right-wing populists as it focuses on the maintenance of the
status quo and incorporates nativism and tradition. The populist radical right (PRR) is seen as a
cultural backlash against the growing hegemony of post-modern values and New Left elites in
top political, economic, and cultural positions. As stand-alone explanations, both the economic
grievance and the cultural backlash schools offer important insights to the discussion
surrounding anti-elite sentiment. Empirical studies tend to find that cultural values and attitudes
are better predictors of an individual's level of populism than economic status and demographic
indicators, however, the social and economic trends that lead to the backlash are not new and
have been in play for decades. Considering this, it is not clear why some people have reacted to
those systemic trends with anti-elitism while others have not. What makes some individuals
more trusting of elites than others? To answer that question, it is necessary to bring economic
grievances together with cultural reaction.
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In Strangers in Their Own Land, Arlie Russell Hochschild identifies a feeling of leftbehind-ness, which reconciles the economic and cultural explanations (Hochschild 2016). As
post-materialist values have become entrenched in society, and levels of education, equal rights,
and secularization have risen, those with more traditionalist values, and those who previously
experienced status security have become sensitive to societal changes they see as threatening
(Betz and Johnson 2004; Hochschild 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017). In a close ethnographic
survey of a Louisiana community, Hochschild uncovers a feeling that the government does not
work for all individuals, and that in some cases, leaders have ‘left’ traditional American society
‘behind’ (Hochschild 2016). There is evidence to suggest that the cultural cleavage is deeply
seated, that it is present in more than just American society, and that it has led to a school of
thought that identifies the “left behind” as a distinct group (Dalton 1988; Gidron and Hall 2017).
“Important segments of the white working class are said to be alienated from societies whose
main currents seem to have left them behind. They feel as if they are ‘strangers in their own
land’ whose value goes unrecognized by the affluent elites…” (Gidron and Hall 2017). This
distinction between the regular folk and the “affluent elites” who are responsible for the
perversion of society leads to anti-elite sentiment among the left behind. It is the elite who are
ushering in the very changes that are unwelcome. In their 2017 article, Gidron and Hall also look
at the left-behind through the operationalization of social connectedness and standing. They
model the ways employment status and skill levels have direct effects on social integration, and
self-identified social status (Gidron and Hall 2017). Being left behind is the result of both
cultural and economic factors, and the people who are likely to feel the most left behind are not
necessarily the poorest or the culturally traditional, but rather they are those who feel they have a
lot at stake in a shifting world (Gidron and Hall 2017).
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We would anticipate that, in general, the population sectors that feel the most left behind
would be majority racial males, with low skills and employment prospects, and who hold
traditional values (Dalton 1988, 2004; Mudde 2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Hochschild
2016; Gidron and Hall 2017; van der Meer and Hahkverdian 2017). Additionally, groups that
have evolved to be the “butt of the joke” are likely to feel left behind and betrayed by their
politicians and pundits (Hochschild 2016). These expectations come from societal changes
during the last 50 years or so; theoretically, just as the rise of racial and gender equality puts men
at odds with women and feminism, it puts the majority racial group at odds with the culture of
multiculturalism and integration. There are, of course, nuances to consider here with this
generalized model, specifically when considering gender and age. Women are not necessarily
any less populist than men, and, as Stephanie Coontz explains in a 2016 interview, “women who
have the fewest opportunities to compete successfully in the labor market are the ones who are
much more likely to support the policies and values that reward a traditional division of labor in
the household,” (Denvir 2016). Women also see themselves as losing in the face of new politics,
and consequently, we should anticipate gender to be a relatively indefinite indicator (Denvir
2016). Similarly, the impact of age differs in scholastic literature; some suggest a substantial agegap in anti-elite sentiment and PRR support, with the elderly feeling estranged as their
generation is displaced, but other studies find that youth are particularly populist (Zhang 2017).
Equal rights for the LGBTQA+ community elicits negative reactions from the very religious and
traditional conservatives. The less educated may feel left behind due to the increase of tertiary
education in developed post-industrial society and the resulting loss of status for secondary
education (Gidron and Hall 2017). As the hub of economic activity has moved from rural areas
to cities and towns, the rural and provincial, and those employed in the agricultural sector, will
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feel left behind. Those who now face unemployment or underemployment due to brain drain or
outsourcing will view themselves in opposition to the “big-wig” elites who made those choices.
The left behind are those who have a social standing and status to protect that has been
threatened by new cultural and economic trends.
The left-behind approach offers a set of hypotheses that will be tested; rather than
following Gidron and Hall directly, this study investigates social integration and self-identified
social status separately.
Hypothesis 1: The more socially integrated a person feels, the less likely they will be to
hold anti-elite sentiments.
Hypothesis 2: The more secure a person’s self-identified social status, the less likely they
will be to hold anti-elite sentiments.
In testing these hypotheses, we can organize independent variables by the hypothesis that
they most closely relate to. Variables of social integration are: rural or urban living, new political
ideas, social trust, political trust, employment, and social interaction. The socially integrated
person will be an employed, urbanite with new political ideas, high levels of social and political
trust, low nativist feelings, and will meet with friends and family regularly. Variables of selfidentified social status (SSS) are: years of education, gender, resentment, and age. A person who
is vulnerable because of their SSS will have lower levels of education and resentful feelings.
They will probably be an elderly male, however, as was previously discussed, there are
variations in results regarding both age and gender.
Research Design and Methodology
This study will draw upon data from Round 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS). The
use of responses from European voters is logical as it builds upon the theoretical framework
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which suggests that developed democracies that have undergone post-material values change
will be the most likely to exhibit anti-elite sentiments, where the elites are defined as political
and cultural elites, as much as, or more than, purely economic elites. This is not to dismiss the
rise of distrust and populism in other areas of the world, but the literature suggests that
manifestations of populism and political distrust and cynicism outside of post-industrial liberal
democracies represent different phenomena (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 1988, 2004; Mudde
2007;Seyd 2008; Ziller and Schübel 2015; Hochschild 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Gidron
and Hall, 2017; van der Meer and Hahkverdian 2017). The European selection allows control
over the basic systemic influences that can be identified from the literature, such as postmaterialist value change, modern media practices, and the shift to an information economy. By
controlling for these for variables, we can better look at what influences attitudes at the
individual level.
The current study will analyze survey responses from approximately 37,500 core voters
between the ages of 18 and 100, from twenty European countries. Countries included in the
survey and the number of respondents from each country can be found in Appendix A. SPSS
statistical software will be used to conduct OLS Linear Regression to model individual level
anti-elite sentiments, where elites are defined as politicians, and level of trust and support is
measured on a 4 point scale. Independent variables used will be age, gender, employment status,
years in education, and various composite measures including social trust, political trust, nativist
sentiment, and social interaction. For the operationalization of the variables used, please see
Appendix B.
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Analysis and Results
Map 1 shows international dispersal of anti-elite attitudes across Europe. The heat map is
based on the percentage of respondents who scored a 1 on the scale of anti-elite sentiment, and
thus have the least favorable attitudes towards elites. Generally, the results indicated on the map
are satisfying and fit with popular epistemology about attitudes in different groups of nations.
For example, Scandinavian states exhibit the lowest levels of anti-elite sentiment, with Norway
reporting less than 10% of people at the lowest operationalized level of anti-elite sentiment.
Similarly, former Soviet states have some of the highest levels of distrust, where in Poland, over
50% of respondents reported the lowest distrust in their elites. As a whole, the heat map does
show the overall trend of rising anti-elite sentiment in advanced democracies, and the variation
across states suggests different historical and cultural influences effecting anti-elite sentiment at
the national level.
The first stage of analysis for the individual level employs bivariate correlations in order
to assess the relationships among variables and the degree and direction of association between
each independent variable and the dependent variable (anti-elite sentiment). To assess H1 (“The
more socially integrated a person feels, the less likely they will be to hold anti-elite sentiments”)
we will use the independent variables previously labeled “indicators of social integration.”
Similarly, to test H2, (“The more secure a person’s self-identified social status, the less likely
they will be to hold anti-elite sentiments,”) the SSS indicators were used. The bivariate
correlation results are presented in Table 1. All variables are significant, and the most robust
relationship is between anti-elite sentiment and political trust (.735**), followed by social trust
(.401), and nativist sentiment (.287**).
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Map 1: Heatmap of anti-elite sentiment across Europe

Most of the measures of social integration: social interaction, political trust, social trust, urban
living, and employment, do correlate in the anticipated direction; new politics, however, does
not. This could be due to the deference to authority that is common in traditional politics. H2 is
partially supported, and both age and gender do correlate as anticipated. The gender result
suggests that men are slightly more trusting of elites than women, and that the elderly exhibit
more anti-elite sentiment than the young. One interesting indicator is years of education, as it is
significantly correlated with every other variable in ways that make intuitive sense.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Variables
Variables

1.

2.

3.

1.Anti-Elite
Sentiment

-

2.Rural/Urban

.047**

-

3.New Politics

.193**

.049**

-

4.Social Trust

.401**

.027**

.203**

-

5.Political Trust

.735**

.056**

.200**

.413**

-

6.Employment

.075**

.030**

.123**

.054**

.067**

-

7.Nativism

.131**

.014**

.186**

.152**

.135**

.101**

-

8. Interaction

.150**

.117**

.203**

.139**

.133**

.004

.125**

-

9.Years of
Education

.038**

.002

-.026**

-.003**

.057**

.261**

.207**

.057**

-

10.Gender

.141**

.073**

.176**

.132**

.139**

.076**

.017**

.023**

-.021**

-

11.Resentment

.287**

.091**

.300**

.280**

.305**

.050**

.270**

.088**

.138**

-.025**

-

12.Age

-.068**

-.026**

-.170**

.003

-.059**

-.247**

.046**

-.201**

-.163**

-.037**

-.063**

-

13.Income Feeling

-.275**

-.008

-.194**

-.276**

-.264**

-.171**

-.195**

-.170**

-.187**

-.066**

-.141**

.046**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
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Results from the multivariate regression can be seen in Table 2, which indicates that many
variables become statistically insignificant, with social trust, political trust, social interaction,
nationalism, age, and income perception remaining significant. A significant regression equation
was found (F(12,28854)=3014.806, p<.000), with an adjusted R² value of .556. This means that
the model can account for roughly 55% of the variance in the dependent variable (anti-elite
sentiment). Analysis of a step-wise regression indicates that much of the variance can be
explained by a single indicator, i.e. political trust. Political trust, social trust, and attitudes toward
income together account for 55.4% of the variance in the model. In the regression, both
education and nativism become much weaker than bivariate correlations indicate in Table 1.
Despite this, education is substantively significant as it is so correlated with other measures.
Similarly, nativism seems to become less robust in the regression model than in the bivariate
correlations.
Table 2: Multi-variate Regression Model
Variable
Rural/Urban
Social Trust
Political Trust
New Politics
Employment
Social Interaction
Years of Education
Gender
Resentment
Nativism
Age
Income Feeling

B
.055
.067
.487
-.003
-.005
-.005
.016
.001
.008
.043
-.018
-.053

Std. Error
.008
.004
.003
.002
.008
.002
.008
.007
.008
.005
.005
.005

Beta
-.001
.079
.667
-.006
.003
.009
.009
.000
.004
.041
-.016
-.046

Sig.
.797
.000
.000
.145
.474
.037
.036
.929
.340
.000
.000
.000

In Table 1, we see that nativism is significantly correlated with every other variable at the .01
level and could be washed out in the control model. For both H1 and H2, it is possible to reject
the null hypothesis: there are relationships between SSS and anti-elite sentiment, and between
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social integration and anti-elite sentiment. We also see that findings are consistent with the idea
that attitudinal measures are more telling than demographics. Furthermore, data analysis lends
support to the direction and causal relationship between the independent variables and dependent
variable.
Conclusion
The last half-century has been characterized by rising anti-elite sentiment and general
political distrust among the public in Western nations. These broad trends can be explained at the
system-level by the rise of globalization, the rise of Internet technology, mass education, and
changing media and political practices. Map 1 indicates that there is an international trend
toward anti-elite sentiment, and that there are differences in attitudes at the level of the
individual: some states, despite living under the same international trends, are more anti-elitist
than others, and some individuals are anti-elitist where others are not. This study sought to
understand why individual Europeans have adopted anti-elite attitudes to a greater extent than
others. Scholars have proposed explanations involving feelings of economic insecurity and a
sense of impending cultural threat. The “left-behind” hypothesis incorporates both cultural and
economic insecurities in its explanation. This study indicates that an individual’s levels of social
and political trust are the most telling indicators of their attitude toward elites, which is in
keeping with the trend for attitudes to be more important explanatory indicators than
demographic measures. This study also finds that the left behind theory is useful for explaining
anti-elite sentiment, as both economic and social variables emerge as significant.
There are limitations to this study that future research could address. One such limitation
was that Round 7 of ESS did not include a question about race. Existing literature suggests that
race and race-driven resentment is an important indicator of anti-elite attitudes and distrust; as
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multi-culturalism and equal-rights for minorities become more important and gain more
attention, majority-race groups may feel angry and out of step with society. Another limitation
relates to the type of elite the study was able to address. This study was only able to evaluate
attitudes towards political elites because of the questions in the data set. Without questions
addressing attitudes towards academics and cultural elites, this study remains incomplete, and it
cannot consider the full range of elites. Future research could include questions that tap into
attitudes toward academics, experts, and cultural elites such as television hosts and news
anchors. Similarly, future research should seek to include a specific marker for race. Also,
because of the differences in trust level across Europe that is indicated in Map 1, it may be
interesting to use dummy variables and control for state. This study contributes to a question of
growing importance in the international community. Growing anti-elite sentiment is a
phenomenon with severe consequences for existing social and political systems and getting to
the heart of these attitudes could help to quell them.
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